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RFC's Contribution to War This article is reprinted by permission of the author, T. H. Brearley,
also known as "Vigilant" on the WWI aviation forum at www.theaerodrome.com. The Indy Squadron would like to express it's gratitude for the opportunity to publish
this article.
For not least among the RFC and RAF contributions to the war effort was the cult
of the air ace. The contribution of this image to morale can be gauged firstly by its popularity among all levels of British
society, and secondly by the lengths to which those in authority went to foster it.
It was the French who created the first 'ace' with Adolphe Pegoud in the spring of
1915, but the phenomenon had its roots in popular pre-war images. Pre-war flying pioneers, due to the risks they took, had
been surrounded by the press with an aura of glamour and daring; and, secondly, aviation effectively took on the role of cavalry
in the war, and so military pilots to some extent inherited the traditional glamour and dash of that role too. Pegoud was
a direct link to the pioneers, being a famous aerobatic pilot before the war, and he may have been proclaimed 'as' (ace; top
of the pack) by the French papers in his pre-war days. In any case the term stuck, and, after his death in August 1915, it
was applied to any French pilot who achieved more than five victories in combat (Pegoud having had six when he died). The
French Aviation Militaire were quite happy to foster this popular image since it was good propaganda, and, that summer,
the commander at Verdun began publishing his pilots' individual scores to stimulate press and public interest. As the Germans
gained air superiority in the Autumn, they followed the French example and made a point of publicising their best pilots,
Immelmann and Boelcke. By 1916, Immelmann was taking time off from the fighting to sell war bonds, tour the Russian front,
pose for picture postcards, talk to journalists, and re-enact his victories in films, which were shown both in Germany and
to troops in the trenches. By mid-1916, Immelmann in Germany, and Guynemer in France, along with a host of lesser 'aces',
were national icons and their exploits were avidly followed by the public. The British official attitude was very different. Perhaps due to a distaste for propaganda,
and an admiration for duty, teamwork and modesty, the British military authorities officially stated that the air force's
top fighter pilots would not be publicised in this way. Tactician Ivor Maxse wrote of "the extreme reticence and horror
of all forms of publicity evinced by the professional soldier", and Haig observed, "I feel sure that officers of the
RFC are proud of being anonymous like their comrades in other branches of the British army."[56] However, after Spring 1917 this line became increasingly something of a front, as
first the British public revealed its desire for British air aces, and then the RFC began to appreciate the need for good
'public relations'.
The scale of the aces' contribution to morale is indicated by the breadth of popularity
they enjoyed within a few years. During the first half of 1916, the careers of the foreign aces had been followed in Britain
almost as closely as in France and Germany. That the aces were such potent propaganda was due naturally to the novelty of
fighting in the air, but events on the ground were also important. The sheer scale of trench-warfare on the Western Front
meant that few individuals stood out, while the lack of movement, unglamorous conditions, and appalling casualty lists conspired
to make the ground war highly unappealing to civilians at home. Consequently, there was a longing for stories of traditional,
even romantic, warfare, where participants fought as individuals, relying only on their personal skills. T.E.Lawrence's exploits
in Arabia and the spy thrillers of John Buchan satisfied this desire; and the war in the air seemed to as well. In the air,
war was personal, and, according to the newspapers, romantically chivalrous. Episodes of real chivalrous behaviour between
opposing airmen were taken as the norm, and, with the equestrian metaphor already in place, it was but a short step for journalists
from the 'cavalry of the clouds' to the 'knights of the air'. Because air ace stories combined novel, individual and romantic elements so well,
there was a real demand in Britain for home-grown flying heroes by 1916, and the bloody Somme offensive of the summer only
strengthened that desire. Thus when Lt. W. Leefe-Robinson shot down the first Zeppelin over England on 2 September 1916 he
immediately found himself a national hero. Similarly, when Lt. Albert Ball, MC, came home from France in October, with nine
victories, he was quickly picked up by the press and found himself proclaimed as Britain's first true ace. That Autumn he
received the DSO and Bar, was feted by civic dignitaries, toured aircraft factories, and had a prototype fighter designed
to his specifications by Austin. His father, meanwhile, was besieged by journalists seeking copies of his letters home. During 1917 and 1918, the exploits of air aces became increasingly popular in Britain.
By 1918, chivalry in the air (helped by the middle-class Ball) had been given a peculiarly British 'sporting' twist, and even
appropriated as a British innovation: "German pilots who had played at being chivalrous knights of the skies, in imitation
of the sportsmanlike Britons, threw off all pretence of decency when they were thoroughly defeated." [57]
And on von Richthofen's death, in April 1918, the illustrated weekly, The Graphic,
led with a feature on "Richthoven's Circus" [sic]. But it was not just the cheap press that was influenced by the cult of
the aces. Even The Times ran an obituary for "the most famous of German airmen", while it regularly carried reports
of German, as well as Allied, aces. [58] The popularity of the air war with the public is also evident in the number of aeroplanes
donated by patriotic groups or individuals, who ranged from munitions workers in Renfrewshire to 'His Serene Highness the
Nizam of Hyderabad'. It is difficult to imagine tanks, for instance, having the same appeal. In Parliament, Lloyd-George extolled
the work of the RFC, using almost every romantic cliché provided by the myth of the aces: "The heavens are their battlefield; they are the Cavalry of the clouds. High above
the squalor and the mud, so high in the firmament that they are not visible from earth, they fight out the eternal issues
of right and wrong. Their daily, yea, nightly struggles are like the Miltonic conflict between the winged hosts of light and
darkness.... From the prime minister to the reader of a tabloid paper, the whole nation could
point to the war in the air as an exciting and noble arena - a positive image of the war. But this public consciousness did not develop
unaided. Steps were taken by those in authority to foster the idea of the ace (despite denials to the contrary), and to use
it for their own ends, and, along with its popularity, this also testifies to the value of the air as propaganda. While Ball
was attracting unprecedented press attention in the Autumn of 1916 the RFC maintained that he was just another pilot like
any other, but already the mask was beginning to slip. When he returned to France, in December, he was allowed to keep his
old aeroplane, despite the fact that his squadron had re-equipped with the newer SE-5 type. However it was only during the
Spring of 1917, when questions were being raised in Parliament about the losses of 'Bloody April' and the German daylight
raids on London, that the propaganda value of aces for the Corps was fully realised. The award of a posthumous VC, shortly
after his death in May, gave the lie to the RFC's official stance that Ball was just another pilot, and was of course highly
popular. In the future, the award of a decoration at an opportune moment was to be one means
by which the RFC and RAF could bring individual pilots to public attention. For example, Canadian ace Billy Bishop was awarded
the DSO on reaching forty-five victories (one more than Ball) rather than for any particular act of courage; and when the
Distinguished Flying Cross replaced the Military Cross for aircrews in 1918, it was given an unofficial threshold of six victories
(in imitation of German practice) making it effectively the mark of an 'ace'. Another sign that the RFC was far from unconcerned
with its aces, were the rules it chose for recording victories (and, indeed, the fact that it recorded them at all). Perhaps
because the RFC was a late starter in the world of aces, Britain adopted the most generous 'scoring' system on the Western
Front.
In addition, because most victories were obtained well over the German side of the
lines, confirmation of kills was often impossible and was therefore not always required. This 'honour' system meant that British
aces could amass scores very quickly, without too many questions being asked, and, as a result, Bishop's claim to have shot
down twenty-five aircraft in his last two weeks in France (twelve of them in the last three days) has been open to question
ever since. However, in this way the RFC was quickly able to reassure the public in later 1917 that its pilots and equipment
were as good as any in Europe. (The RAF's 'generous' attitude to confirmation was continued after the war, when it agreed
in 1919 to posthumously raise Major 'Mick' Mannock's score to seventy-three: one above Bishop's total.) A realisation that
the value of aces lay in their propaganda activities, more than in their fighting skills, is also evident in the efforts that
were made to keep them alive. Shortly before his death, Ball had been offered two weeks' leave by Trenchard himself, but had
refused the offer. In 1917, Bishop was allowed extended leave in Canada, which turned into a recruitment drive. In 1918 he
was posted back to England as an instructor, and he was removed again from active service in the summer of 1918 to take up
a staff job. During the last twelve months of the conflict, Bishop was in a front line squadron for only three months.
But the RFC and RAF went well beyond purely military tools such as decorations, postings
and scores in order to raise the profiles of their aces. Aces were allowed to sit for portraits by Official War Artists; Billy
Bishop and James McCudden were encouraged to write books; and official propaganda films were increasingly tilted towards air
fighting. In 1916 fighter pilots did not appear at all in an eight minute short sponsored by the War Office entitled The
Eyes of the Army. However, the next year, Billy Bishop and his squadron featured in the sixteen minute With the Royal
Flying Corps (Somewhere in France), and by 1918, the lengthy fifty-one minute production, Tails Up France - the life
of an RAF officer in France, was entirely devoted to fighter pilots. [60]
So, popular interest and official manipulation interacted in Britain from 1916 to
produce one of the most positive images of a war otherwise synonymous with anonymity and squalor. The popularity of a romanticised
image of the air war demonstrates just how widespread the psychological need was for antidote to the trenches. And that even
reticent British army professionals were forced to climb down from a principled rejection of the idea of aces, and engage
in some highly dubious statistical manoeuvring, shows how valuable this popular attraction was to the authorities. At home,
the idea helped the government to 'sell' total war to a civilian population wholly unused to the sacrifices involved. In France
meanwhile, it was an important morale booster and point of reference for troops enduring an existence that was neither pristine,
mobile, personal or glamorous. On the German side, Ludendorff rated the name of Richthofen as equivalent to three infantry
divisions, when it came to motivating his men. [61]
Although materially the efforts of the RFC and RAF between 1914 and 1918 pale almost
into insignificance compared with the airpower achievements of the Second World War, their overall contribution to victory
stands comparison.
FOOTNOTES
[56] D.Winter, op.cit., p.133
[57] H.Wilson and J.Hammerlon (eds), The Great War - The Standard History of the
World-Wide Conflict, (Amalgamated Press, London 1914-1919) , xi, p.394
[58] "Capt. Richthofen Killed", London The Times, 23 April 1918, p.6
[59] Vote of Thanks to the Royal Navy, Army and Mercantile Marine 29 October 1917,
'Hansard' Official Report of the Parliamentary Debates: Commons, xcviii, 1247
[60] M.Paris, From the Wright Brothers to Top Gun: Aviation, Nationalism and Popular
Cinema, (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1995)
[61] D.Winter, op.cit., p.133
[62] M.Paris, Winged Warfare: the Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain,
1859-1917, (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1992), p.239
BIBLIOGRAPHY [as it relates to the snippet above]
T.Holt, Till the Boys Come Home: The Picture Postcards of the First World War,
(Macdonald and Jane's, London 1977)
E.J.Leed, No Man's Land: Combat and Identity in World War One, (Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 1979)
M.Paris, Winged Warfare: the Literature and Theory of Aerial Warfare in Britain,
1859-1917, (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1992)
M.Paris, From the Wright Brothers to Top Gun: Aviation, Nationalism and Popular
Cinema, (Manchester University Press, Manchester 1995)
D.Winter, The First of the Few: Fighter Pilots of the First World War, (Penguin,
Bungay, Suffolk 1983) |
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